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Abstract:
Since 1973, the federal government, through the Supreme Court of the United States, has
acted to protect, the rights of women in their ability to choose to have an abortion without
excessive governmental restriction. This thesis analyzes how and why access to abortion will
shift in the face of the Supreme Court’s overturning of Roe v. Wade (1973), likely to occur this
June. This thesis begins with an in-depth description of how and why abortion became illegal,
how and why abortion became legal, and how opposition has developed against legal abortion.
Through the last few decades, though especially in the last few years, most states have signed
into law statutes that greatly limit a woman’s access to abortion, and several have signed into law
statutes that will act to ban abortion in nearly all cases if Roe is repealed. This thesis examines
what precisely state law, as well as lasting precedents put forth by the Supreme Court in other
cases related to abortion, and the response of the other branches of the federal government to the
issue of abortion, will mean for a woman’s access to abortion throughout the United States. I
found, over the course of this project, that access to abortion will shift most substantially in states
which do not, by constitutional interpretation or statute, protect one’s fundamental right to
acquire an abortion. This shift will, also, be felt most by impoverished persons, as these persons
are less likely to be able to travel for abortions.
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Introduction
Throughout this thesis, the overarching goal is to understand how access to abortion will
change following the likely repeal of Roe v. Wade (1973) this summer in Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Organization. While the outcome is not yet settled, a repeal of Roe appears
likely either this term or in the near future. In understanding what this judgment will signify, we
should clarify what precisely the judgment regarding Roe v. Wade meant for access to abortion
within the country. This case, as filed under the name Jane Roe, to protect the identity of the
plaintiff Norma McCorvey, began in Texas in 1970 when the plaintiff sued Henry Wade, the
District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas at the time of filing, for violating her constitutional
rights (Abortion: U.S. Supreme Court Decisions 2018). The language of the Texas law,
specifically articles 1191 through 1194 and 1196 to the Texas Penal Code in 1925, was such that
abortion was only legal in cases where the mother's health was the reason for the abortion (Baton
2010). More specifically, Article 1191, of this criminal code, described abortion as the process
by which “the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman’s womb or that a
premature birth thereof be cause,” and the aforementioned article, along with Articles 11921194, described the punishment for those seeking procurement or procuring abortions, as well as
essentially anyone involved in the process. Via the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court found these statutes unconstitutional, as they infringe upon
these constitutional rights, a judgment previously reached by the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas prior to Wade’s appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
(Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970) n.d.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
While the Supreme Court did not agree with Roe regarding completely free and unrestricted
access to abortion without governmental restriction, the Supreme Court did, in a seven-two
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decision, judge that the laws which aimed to restrict access to abortion excessively were
unconstitutional, with attention to the placement of the abortion in the timeline of the trimester
framework. In the language of this judgment, laws aiming to restrict access to abortion would be
subject to strict scrutiny, as the right to choose abortion was to be held as a fundamental right
guaranteed to women (Abortion: U.S. Supreme Court Decisions 2018; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) n.d.; Batten 2010).
Of course, Roe v. Wade is not the only judgment by which access to abortion is governed.
Perhaps, a more vital judgment in understanding the shift from limited restrictions on access to
abortion to more significant restrictions on access to abortion at the state level, as will be
described in greater detail in Chapter Three, is Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992). Having altered the structure by which the legality of abortion may
be discerned by state governments, from the trimester framework to the viability standard, and
changing the standard by which restrictive laws may be judged by the court, from strict scrutiny
to undue burden. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey proved to, while
upholding the fundamentals of Roe v. Wade, provide states significantly greater leeway in
deciding how access to abortion may look within their jurisdictions (Devins 2009).1 This case
was brought by Planned Parenthood in representation of several clinicians. The case, which
found issue with Pennsylvania’s newly amended abortion control laws in 1988 and 1989, was a
rather close battle (five-to-four), in which only one provision, necessity for spousal notice prior
to abortion, was struck down due to undue burden.2 Robert P. Casey, the defendant in this case,
was targeted for this suit, as he was the Governor of Pennsylvania at this time and signed into

1
2

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992).
Id.
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law these abortion control laws. With that noted, this judgment is vital in understanding how and
why legislation, at both the federal and state level, restricting access to abortion has developed to
the extent it stands today. With these two judgments described in basic detail, we may learn
about the other facets related to the evolution of the abortion debate.
Currently, the majority of Supreme Court justices are strongly conservative and have
indicated support for a repeal of Roe v. Wade (Metroka 2017, 2). With the passage of the
Gestational Age Act by the Mississippi state government in 2018, as well as similar legislation
recently passed or close to passage in other states, this presents a direct challenge to the basic
protections of Roe v. Wade (Andrusko 2021). Given the current makeup of the court, it is likely
that Mississippi’s law will be found constitutional, and the current federal protection for access
to abortion will be repealed (Andrusko 2021). Further description of the Roberts court will
appear in Chapter Two, as its membership has proven vital to understanding contemporary trends
in abortion legislation.
The question which guides the work of this thesis is formulated as follows: “In what
ways would the repeal of Roe v. Wade impact access to abortion for women of child-bearing age
in the United States?” Understanding how the repeal of Roe v. Wade may alter the access to
abortion for this population is vital, as further probed in Chapter Three, to understanding the
greater significance of the Mississippi decision, as the Supreme Court will likely reach a verdict
this June. If the current Supreme Court repeals Roe v. Wade, which has provided protections
central to understanding the rights of women and their ability to reach decisions regarding their
bodies, the conversation regarding abortion in the United States is expanded for state
governments, as well as other branches of the federal government. It is worth noting that the
focus is not on arguments for or against legalized access to abortion. These arguments are merely
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analyzed to understand a timeline for legislation, as well as the legal precedents that could come
out of governmental response to these changes. I will remain neutral in the matter of whether
abortion is morally just or in the best interest of prospective mothers, as these arguments are
irrelevant to the question at hand.
Chapter One focuses on the development of arguments against abortion and the formation
of alliances that would fight federally mandated access to abortion, like the response of the
American Medical Association (AMA) to state laws requiring relevant clinicians to provide
abortions in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, and the later Republican platform shift to one
pitted against federally protected abortion (Greenhouse and Siegel 2011, Telzrow 2008). In the
United States, abortion was once legal under common law and was common practice, without
any major adversary from religious public action groups or otherwise (Ginsberg and Shulman
2021; Greenhouse and Siegel 2011). From 1857, with the movement of the AMA championing
anti-abortion legislation on the state level against rising tides of feminism, abortion was illegal in
most U.S. states, though several states outside the Midwest and South regions held exceptions
relating to the health of the mother or exceptions in cases of incest and rape. Within this period
of changing popular opinions, there were several phases worth considering in different lights, as
legal abortion became much more vital in the mid-20th century and grew in support of further
expansion of the Civil Rights Movement. Understanding which states allowed abortion under
certain circumstances, and those which outright banned abortion, is vital to understanding how
access to abortion will look nationally if Roe v. Wade is repealed. In states where abortion was
illegal in all circumstances prior to Roe, there was a relatively limited framework of clinicians
willing to pursue illegal abortions, with higher complications for the recipients of these illegal
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abortions, compared to the much more extensive framework in the Western and Eastern states
(Telzrow 2008).
With federal intervention, via Roe v. Wade, one may believe that abortion, especially if
the recipient lives in a state on the West or East Coast, is easily accessible to those who need or
want an abortion today. Instead, several states have severely limited access to abortion for
females of child-bearing age, as well as the much-needed aftercare, via several methods. Chapter
Two, which focuses on the state of access to abortion as it stands before the Mississippi decision
in June 2022, delves into the ways in which many states have fought against the protections
provided by Roe v. Wade. Texas, as it has been one of the strongest opponents of the legality of
abortion since it became an issue, has moved to greatly restrict abortion to the point where
women have to drive miles upon miles to reach a clinic which will perform an abortion. The
method by which the abortion is performed is limited, and women may only acquire abortions if
there is no detectable heartbeat (Baum et al. 2016; Bentele, Sager, and Aykanian 2018; Fuentes
et al. 2020). This section includes a description of several other state laws and the actions certain
states, primarily in the South-Southeast United States, have taken to limit access to abortion
significantly. There is also attention paid to the expanding effects of these laws, from access to
abortion procedures, which are often needed in cases wherein women have imminent
miscarriages, and a woman’s ability to acquire proper aftercare from a medical professional,
which has been proven vital to their survival (Bahoh 2009).
Furthermore, the thesis considers the differences between states in their attempts to either
expand protection and access to abortion for those who desire it, or undermine the protections
provided by Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton (1973). These two landmark cases, as decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States, are merely the most prominently known Supreme Court
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decisions regarding abortion rights and are the widest in berth of protection. Due to the liberal
majority under the Burger Court (1969-1986) and the position of Warren Burger as Chief Justice
during this period, this was a session in which liberal reform prospered in the rulings of the
Supreme Court (Abortion: U.S. Supreme Court Decisions 2018). The Burger Court represented a
steppingstone from the Warren Court, known as the most effective period of the Supreme Court
in implementation of liberal social justice reform via its rulings, to the period of conservative
courts which has lasted to this day (expanded by the Supreme Court nominations under Donald J.
Trump). The political control the Republicans, Democrats, or certain NGO's have over state and
local government is important in understanding why and how a given state has adopted
legislation, from restrictive laws prior to the repeal of Roe v. Wade to trigger laws in place if Roe
v. Wade is repealed. Chapter Three delves into renditions of trigger laws and certain states'
actions to repeal or alter trigger laws they put into place directly after the decision of Roe v.
Wade (Andrusko 2019; Reproductive Rights - State Law - Illinois repeals anti-abortion law
2018).
Given the importance of political leanings within a court, popular sentiment and the wills
of political action groups are vital elements to the establishment, or destruction, of any body of
law. This information is combined with the history of our nation, with respect to access to
abortion prior to 1973, and a thorough understanding of trigger laws in Republican and
Democrat dominated states helps draw conclusions about how access to abortion will shift. The
focal point of this subsection of Chapter Three is to describe how access to abortion will likely
transition after the removal of its federal protection. Conclusions must be rooted in legal
precedent and must be logically derived, though they remain tenuous, as we cannot be sure how
state governments will act to uphold their laws, if said conclusions are to have merit in the
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academic community. Local governments may act in ways dissimilar to state laws if the state
does not enforce these laws at the county level; just as state governments that have shifted in
political leanings may entirely disregard their trigger laws.
Chapters Four bleeds into the Conclusions section in a description of how access to
abortion will look. We cannot be certain how this legal shift will affect the daily operations of
local governments in restricting or promoting access to abortion. Local governments often act in
ways dissimilar to the wills of the state government in counties where the political leanings of
the citizens are far more conservative or liberal than the state government. I provide commentary
on the issues which need further study, like access to the procedure, which removes a
miscarriage in places where abortion is difficult to acquire, and how other methods for acquiring
abortions will become popular in the face of less access. Transportation to states that provide
abortion services and relevant aftercare may become a primary method to protect the rights of
women via Planned Parenthood, and other such organizations. By the end of this section, we may
understand how the repeal of Roe v. Wade will affect the lives of women in their child-bearing
years via their access to abortion in cases where the Republicans lead over the Democrats. This
access will likely be most greatly affected in states that have already acted to restrict abortion
access, where further restrictive laws will be triggered upon the repeal of Roe v. Wade. Though,
due to similar predictive bills with inverse intentions, many states on the coasts will likely see
little change in access to abortion or aftercare. Funding for NGO’s which protect women's rights
will likely increase exponentially, allowing their efforts to bleed into Southern and Midwestern
states.
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Chapter One: Access to Abortion prior to Roe v. Wade
Abortion is an issue often neglected in civil discourse among acquaintances, though it has
been a hot button issue for just over a century since its entrance to state and local politics. This
issue has reentered the discussion at the Supreme Court of the United States. It was in the mid19th century that this topic became an issue for members of state governments, as the American
Medical Association pushed for legislative change.
English common law, which represented much of the body of law in the United States in
the 18th century, held abortion as legal prior to the “quickening,” described as when the unborn
child can be recognized as a life (Telzrow 2008, 34). This test, while it is inaccurate by today’s
standards due to significant medical advancement, was fairly lenient to those who desired
abortion, and had to be proven without a doubt to deny abortion (Telzrow 2008, 34–35). Proper
medical understanding of the processes of a pregnancy was simply far more limited. It was the
understanding of many physicians, and the public alike, that life was not truly viable until
evidence of that life was visually clear from outside the womb (Telzrow 2008, 34–35).
Moralistic and religious arguments against abortion were limited until after the viability of the
life inside was abundantly clear, so women of this era found no issue with abortions generally.
As understanding grew regarding fetal development, the medical field became the
champion of anti-abortion legislation (Telzrow 2008, 37). Through the early 19th century, the
medical practitioners of the United States, having suffered a fairly poor reputation due to their
failures to accurately respond to medical issues of their patients (often worsening their conditions
through practices like bloodletting), developed greater education practices for the profession, as
well as far stricter restrictions on who was allowed to practice medicine (Telzrow 2008, 37–38).

Foster, Mitchell 10
In this push for universality in medical treatment and advancement in medical knowledge
came the formation of the American Medical Association (AMA); this organization would push
forward the envelope of anti-abortion legislation by presenting their understanding of inception,
the point at which an egg is fertilized, to state legislators (Telzrow 2008, 37-38). Of course, the
claims of doctors were not so easily trusted, nor was the importance of their medical findings
abundantly clear to state legislators (Reagan 1997, 80–82). With this fact in mind, the AMA
began its coordinated assault on legal abortion by, first, “reeducating American women and the
public about the immorality and dangers of abortion (Reagan 1997, 82).” Following this move,
anti-abortion physicians purged abortionists within the AMA, as well as other medical societies,
which worked closely with the AMA, and finally presented to the state legislature the notion that
abortion was the project of immigrant midwives (Reagan 1997, 82-85: 94-102). With most
abortion recipients being middle-class white women, this was, to the greater public, a frightful
image; one especially frightful to the primarily white voting class and primarily white legislators
(Peterson 2012; Reagan 1997, 81). It was through this image that race and social class were the
driving factors of importance, that state legislators were, by their constituents (who desired
greater growth of the white population) and by rampant petitions against legal abortion from the
AMA, forced to take action against abortion via legislation aimed to criminalize abortionists
(Peterson 2012; Reagan 1997, 82-85: 90-98).
Gender, naturally, played a rather pressing role in understanding why the actions of the
AMA were triumphant. It was, while it lacked contestation at the time, primarily the feeling of
quickening felt by the woman that acted as the bar for abortions (Peterson 2012; Telzrow 2008,
38). Thus, the AMA, through proving that the quickening was nonsense, argued that the people
who still believed quickening was the time in which women should no longer acquire abortion,
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which were primarily women, were horribly ignorant and evil (Peterson 2012; Reagan 1997, 83–
85). There was, past the AMA, another key actor in the fight for legislation against legal
abortion: the social movements against abortion (Kastellec 2016, 7). By 1890, every state in the
union effectively banned abortion nationally, with staunch punishments for both physicians and
patients who went ahead with illegal abortions. Some physicians, however, continued to provide
abortions after state legislation banned them, to save patients who would have died during
regular childbirth and those who felt a pregnancy would ruin their future (Kastellec 2016, 6–8;
Telzrow 2008, 38).
Though the first wave feminist movement did not support legalized abortion, the first
major argument for legalized abortion came to fruition in the early 20th century, with clear
evidence that illegal abortions were more dangerous than legal abortions (Bahoh 2009, 10;
Telzrow 2008, 38). Proponents of legal abortion were primarily focused on the health of young
women, who felt that an abortion was their only option in a country that neglects the needs of
young, unmarried women in procurement of contraception or life-saving procedures if the
pregnancy would come at great danger to the woman. This fact directly illuminates the greater
use of illegal abortion by pregnant women with lower economic statuses (Ashcraft and Lang
2006, 193-194; Bahoh 2009, 9-10). The poorest women, in other words, felt the impact of illegal
abortion far more than their wealthy counterparts. In response to this issue, the American Law
Institute (ALI) began issuing requests in 1957 for exceptions in state legislation for cases in
which the mother's health would be negatively affected if an abortion was not provided, as well
as cases in which rape or incest were the reason for the pregnancy (Greenhouse and Siegel 2011,
2035–37; Telzrow 2008, 38). From the so-called “ALI-Style Law” of the original state
(Colorado), for which their alternative law was proposed, came a widespread implementation
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over the next 15 years in states, which have remained strong proponents of legal abortion
(Kastellec 2016, 8–9; Roemer 1971, 500–504). Planned Parenthood paired with the ALI to
attempt to, by bringing forth a plethora of legal challenges in states where ALI-style laws had not
yet been signed into effect, widen one’s right to acquire birth control (Kastellec 2016, 8–9).
Though these two organizations tirelessly advocated for the rights of women nationally,
only a few states, past the four which had already repealed their bans on abortion (Alaska,
Hawaii, New York, and Washington), legalized abortion before the Supreme Court intervened on
the matter. The National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) had effectively blocked reform for
decades, making the process of reform somewhat difficult (Kastellec 2016, 9–13). A vital shift in
this period came in the form of a platform shift for the organization, which had championed antiabortion legislation for a century, the AMA. Doctors began to recognize, via statistical evidence
proving the detriments of anti-abortion legislation on the lives of women in their child-bearing
years, that supporting the legalization of abortion in necessary cases was ethically just (Telzrow
2008, 38). This shift was effective in bolstering the support of state representatives in lifting
abortion bans and breaking down reform barriers. With the pro-choice movement gaining
traction, lawsuits dealing with abortion grew exponentially, and, as cases of this gravity
sometimes do, some rose the level of the Supreme Court. Roe v. Wade happened to be the first
case in which the Supreme Court rendered a judgment for legal abortion. Some argue that while
this safeguarded abortion for several decades, the Supreme Court's intervention on the matter
altered the long-term direction of the political debate en masse (Kastellec 2016, 9–15). While
support for legislation which legalized and protected a woman’s right to acquire an abortion
grew in the great public, regardless of political party, the NRLC was beginning to lose its grasp
on the public in many states (Kastellec 2016, 9). The proponents of this theory, which describes
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Roe v. Wade as the catalyst for centralization in a movement against legal abortion, as the
Republicans would form an alliance with the NRLC in their mission, have little evidence that
this same alliance would not have been made without Roe v. Wade (Kastellec 2016, 10–13).
Perhaps the most pressing step in understanding what Roe meant, and means alongside SCOTUS
decisions since Roe, is simply moving forward with the understanding that Roe v. Wade did more
in promoting and protecting access to abortion across the nation than the ALI or Planned
Parenthood had done in years prior, while the work of these organizations was a vital
background to the Supreme Court's decision in this case.

Chapter Two: Access to Abortion post-Roe v. Wade
Post Roe v. Wade, proponents of the pro-life movement tirelessly fought against abortion
in every way possible, though generally kept within the bounds of the law. Its membership,
bipartisan in the period directly after Roe v. Wade, quickly shifted as the Republicans realized a
new way to raise funding and grow the party: Evangelicals and Catholics (Greenhouse and
Siegel 2011, 2077–85). Naturally, it was not such a linear progression, and the Republicans were
not responsible for the formation of new coalitions against abortion.
At the time of Roe, rather, sixty-eight percent of Republicans, per a Gallup Poll taken just
prior to Roe, agreed that “the decision to have an abortion should be made solely by a woman
and her physician,” while only fifty-eight percent of Democrats agreed with the same statement
(Greenhouse and Siegel 2011, 2068–69). Only six years after Roe, we began to see a major
divergence between the two parties in conceiving of this issue (Greenhouse and Siegel 2011,
269). Separate from the two parties, a nonjudicial actor took great issue with ALI reform bills
and formed perhaps the most substantial coalition against legal abortion: The NRLC

Foster, Mitchell 14
(Greenhouse and Siegel 2011, 2077). The Catholic Church had, over the past two decades,
fought hard against petitions for legal abortions put forth by the ALI via well-financed PAC
funding for politicians willing to fight against these laws (Greenhouse and Siegel 2011, 2077–
79). While most of these politicians were Democrats at first, the Republican party realized the
greater potential of this funding and, more importantly, the potential of the party in acquiring the
support of millions of single-issue voters (Greenhouse and Siegel 2011, 2079–80). As the
comingling of the NRLC and the Republican party grew, so did evangelical Protestants grow in
discontent with the prevalence of what they termed “secular humanism,” which referred to many
aspects of the Civil Rights Movement, as well as the direction of the Warren and Burger Courts
(Greenhouse and Siegel 2011, 2064–65). Though the evangelicals had largely remained either
out of the abortion debate or supportive of legal abortion, it was through the “broad-based attack
on cultural developments,” like gay rights and the Equal Rights Amendment, that the
evangelicals became anti-abortion. Through this shift, the Republicans were able to recruit the
evangelical masses to their platform with the promise of the retention of the values they
desperately wanted to maintain (Greenhouse and Siegel 2011, 2064–65). Through connecting the
party’s platform to family and faith values, which the working class, which had primarily voted
Democrat, cared for greatly, the Republicans were able to simultaneously rob the Democrats of a
significant portion of their voter base, acquire immense funding from the religious right, and
name itself the champion of American values for decades to come (Greenhouse and Siegel 2011,
2080–82). This was, thus, the formation of the movement against legal abortion, which we know
today, as championed by the Republican Party.
With the formation of the opposition to legal abortion described, we may shift in focus to
how the constitutional right to abortion for women has been maintained by the Supreme Court
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thus far; the fight against legal abortion has remained one focused on restricting this access as
vastly as is legal, until recently.
In understanding the protections provided by the Supreme Court for a woman’s right to
acquire an abortion without excessive governmental restriction, we must not consider Roe v.
Wade the only guiding judgment. Rather, the Planned Parenthood v. Casey decision, a judgment
where the Supreme Court decided to protect the fundamental protection of Roe v. Wade, but
rejected the trimester framework, allowed greater governmental restriction due to its
implementation of the viability standard (Halva-Neubauer and Zeigler 2010, 103–4). This
decision, having overturned elements of Roe v. Wade, as well as City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health (1983) and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (1986), was a close decision, with only 5-4, which represented the first substantial
success of the Republicans in their mission to repeal Roe v. Wade (Halva-Neubauer and Zeigler
2010, 106-107). Directly following Casey, the Rehnquist court upheld a Missouri law in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) which imposed extensive restrictions on clinics that
provided abortions in a financial and institutional manner. This represented a green light for
further restrictive legislation enacted by state governments (Abortion: U.S. Supreme Court
Decisions 2018, 6–9). Though there had been notable wins for the Republicans in the form of the
Hyde Amendment (1976), which cut federal funding to abortion services, and the judgment
regarding Connecticut v. Menillo (1975), which allowed states to control who may perform
abortions, it was Webster v. Reproductive Health Services which separated the period directly
after Roe in which Roe was generally upheld and bolstered and the subsequent decades in which
Roe has eroded exponentially more over time (Abortion: U.S. Supreme Court Decisions 2018, 4–
10; Bentele, Sager, and Aykanian 2018, 492–94).
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As the Supreme Court has played a crucial role in the abortion debate since Roe, we must
consider how the population of the Supreme Court from 1973 to the present day may have
affected the outcomes of the judgments during this period. Several socially liberal justices, like
William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, who acted as champions of the liberal wing of the
Supreme Court, were replaced by justices like David Souter and Clarence Thomas during George
H. W. Bush’s presidency. Though these replacements were diametrically opposed to those they
replaced, they were not the most significant replacements, considering the last twenty years.
While each specific replacement has been vital, the pattern is far more telling. Prior to 1985,
when the Republicans and the Democrats grew far more divided than the country had seen for
longer than a century, Supreme Court nominations were less politically divisive in nature
(Devins and Baum 2019, 60–64). It was during the mid-twentieth century that the court, as the
Republicans and Democrats were both rather left in their political leanings, swayed left during
the Warren and Burger court sessions, as several more conservative justices became more liberal
in their decisions during this time (Devins and Baum 2019, 60–62). This alone signifies the
newfound importance of the political leanings of the Court, as justices are far more politically
divided than during the courts prior to the Rehnquist Court.
The Supreme Court has become far more politically divided, as the median justices
appear to be Justices Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, and Barrett, who are far more conservative leaning
than previous median justices. Beginning with Nixon’s efforts to overturn the rulings of the
Warren Court, the Republican party has been able to systematically take over the Supreme Court
via strategic nominations of Justices partial to their causes. Nixon came to nomination several of
the most vital actors regarding Roe, justices: Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell,
and William Rehnquist. Ford was, also, interested in repealing the judgments of the Warren
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Court with his nomination of Justice Stevens, though Stevens become crucial later on in the
battle against abortion. Reagan was the first president to appoint justices in attempt to
specifically target Roe and Bush’s replacement of Justices Marshall and Brennan, with Justices
Souter and Thomas, appear to have been the beginning of the end of Roe. While Reagan’s
appointments of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Rehnquist were quite significant in altering
the political median of the Supreme Court which did yield some judgments that undermine Roe,
both Bush administrations and the Trump administration rendered nominations which went
beyond simply shifting the median point of political sentiments within the court. Rather, these
nominations, as executed by Trump and the then present Congress, altered the platform from one
rather moderate in scope, as the Rehnquist Court was fairly mixed in membership (though it was
certainly more politically conservative than the two courts prior), to one dominated by
conservative justices which appear willing to roll back precedents reached by prior courts. Part
of this success may be due to luck, as, despite the presidency swaying roughly equal between the
parties since 1969, the Republicans have been able to put forward fifteen out of nineteen
nominations for the Supreme Court within this same period. That said, this pattern is primarily
due to the successes of the Republican party in delaying nominations to the Supreme Court
during the presidencies of Democrats, or during periods in which the Senate holds a Democrat
majority, in an effort to only allow Republican presidents, with Republican senates, to nominate
and secure Supreme Court seats for those leaning conservative (Sarat 2016, 46–50).
Though notable successful nominations, and subsequent replacements of Supreme Court
Justices, began during Reagan’s presidency, with O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy,
the nominations during the Bush presidencies and the Trump presidency were transformative in
the process by which the Republicans have annexed the court (Basinger and Mak 2020; Sarat
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2016, 49). While most of the Supreme Court nominations during the 1980s and 1990s were
bipartisan to varying degree, the Senate’s voting has become far more partisan starting with the
presidency of George W. Bush (Sarat 2016, 44, 49, 51-57). While Reagan had three unanimously
Senate-approved Supreme Court nominations and several presidents prior had experienced these
universal confirmations, the highest percentage of Senate votes in confirming one Supreme
Court Justice in the last two decades was the nomination of Chief Justice Roberts under Bush II
(Sarat 2016, 49). While close Senate confirmations of Supreme Court nominations had occurred
prior, even as late as Bush’s nomination of Alito, Supreme Court confirmations became far
closer even after the Democrats invoked the “Nuclear option” just prior to a Republican takeover
of the Senate in 2014 (Sarat 2016, 49, 70–72). This rendition of the nuclear option, as carried out
by Harry Reid, essentially repealed the decision of the Senate in 1975 to require a three-fifths
majority to acquire a vote to cloture for executive and judicial branch nominees (Wawro and
Schickler 2018). Reid’s version, however, only applied to district and appeals court level judges
until it was extended, by the Republicans during Trump’s presidency, to affect Supreme Court
nominations (Wawro and Schickler 2018). The nuclear option, in either form, would have
represented a major win had Hillary Clinton won as Reid expected, as Democrats have often
struggled to surpass Republican filibustering in many aspects of governing (Wawro and
Schickler 2018). Even still, the removal of the Senate filibuster will likely aid Democrats in
future partisan battles wherein the Republicans now lack one of their greatest weapons (Wawro
and Schickler 2018). This action, while both parties had desired it occasionally in the course of
lengthy opposite party filibusters in the past, has proved crucial to the Republican takeover of the
Supreme Court under Donald Trump, just as it would have proved vital in acting to dominate the
Supreme Court had Hillary Clinton won (Wawro and Schickler 2018). While Clinton and Obama

Foster, Mitchell 19
confirmed two liberal leaning Supreme Court Justices each, the Republicans only needed to
replace one liberal leaning Supreme Court Justice as Obama’s presidency came to an end; Trump
effectively, by replacing Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg with far more conservative leaning
Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh, implemented the final shift necessary for Roe to go (Basinger
and Mak 2020).
While strategic nominations for the Supreme Court and shifts in political leanings of the
court are nothing new, the extent to which the Republicans currently dominate the Supreme
Court is important. With six Republican Justices, all of whom have come out in support of
rolling back Roe v. Wade, and only three Justices nominated by Democrats, which are unlikely to
convince the swing votes to support the constitutionality of Roe v. Wade, the judgment of the
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization becomes much more predictable.

Chapter Three: Trigger Laws, Constitutional Interpretations and
Everlasting Debates
If Roe v. Wade is overturned, we may be certain that the current federal oversight will
change. It is currently unclear how the Supreme Court will interact with abortion after their
judgment is reached regarding Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. Having
dispensed judgment regarding several other cases related to abortion and access to abortion since
Roe v. Wade, the Court will likely remain involved in matters related to abortion. If SCOTUS is
to repeal the viability standard, many other decisions set upon the foundation of Roe will have to
be reconsidered in their legitimacy as precedents in future cases. Naturally, also, there will be
future cases which elevate to the level of the SCOTUS regarding abortion, which assures us that
the court will remain a major actor in the abortion debate, though potentially less vital to day-to-
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day access to abortion for women in the United States. The ways in which the states will respond
to this repeal are much clearer than the executive and legislative branches of the federal
government. Historically, the federal government has only contended with abortion to a limited
degree until 1971 with United States v. Vuitch and did not rule in support of legal access to
abortion until 1973 with Roe v. Wade.
With this in mind, the U.S. Congress has put forth some legislation to restrict access to
abortion in the past, like the Hyde Amendment (1976) and the Partial-Birth Abortion Act (2003),
which has acted to assure that those seeking to provide or acquire abortion do not receive federal
tax dollars. The latter act, as affirmed by the SCOTUS in their judgment regarding the case of
Gonzalez v. Carhart (2003), rendered intact dilation and extractions (D&X) abortions federally
illegal. As anti-abortion sentiments were bipartisan in 1976, with Democratic control of the U.S.
Congress, and Republicans held a majority in the Congress in 2003, the passage of these laws
was expected at the time. Since then, both parties have enjoyed roughly equal time in partisan
control of the Congress and the presidency, though the Democrats have, partially due to strategic
filibustering by the Republicans, remained ineffectual in signing into law acts which would
protect access to abortion in the case that Roe were overturned. A significant aspect of this
failure to protect access to abortion is that, while abortion became partisan in the late 1990’s,
many Democrats-representatives were not pro-choice (few Democratic representatives currently
serving remain anti-abortion). Even Democrats who claimed to be pro-choice, like Clinton or
Obama, failed to ever bolster Roe v. Wade and roll back federal laws, which undermined the
protections present within Roe. A superb example of this lackluster effort is Bill Clinton, as he
claimed he would pass a piece of legislation further protecting one’s right to acquire an abortion,
entitled the “Freedom of Choice Act,” though he never mentioned it again in his presidency
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(Smith 2021). Though the bill in question was introduced a few times in the Senate and once in
the House of Representatives, it never received grand support from either party.
That said, the Democrats have genuinely attempted to sign into law acts that would repeal
the Hyde Amendment and bolster Roe. The Equal Access for Abortion Coverage in Health
Insurance Act, as introduced in the House of Representatives in 2019 and 2021 (though similar
acts have been introduced previously), would have repealed the Hyde Amendment and protected
a woman’s right to be covered by their insurance in acquiring an abortion. In these efforts, the
House of Representatives has attempted to put forth legislation which protects one’s right to
abortion in the case that Roe v. Wade is overruled: The Women’s Health Protection Act of 2021
(Donovan 2020, 3–4). While this piece of legislation did pass the House of Representatives with
few amendments, it did not pass the Senate in any version. Of course, this failed vote was likely,
as the Democrats, via two independent voters, which consistently caucus with the Democrats,
and the tie-breaking vote of Vice President Kamala Harris, held only a thin majority in the
Senate, not a majority enough to represent three-fifths of the Senate on the best of days
(Donovan 2020, 3–4). This three-fifths majority would have been necessary to override a
filibuster and move onto passage through the Senate, though a vote to cloture was not reached in
the Senate. Perhaps the most shocking aspect of voting on H.R. 3755 in the Senate was the six,
split three and three down party lines, Senators who did not vote, and the subsequent failure of
the Democrats to acquire a majority vote in the Senate.
There are a few issues worth noting here. First off, Senator Manchin from West Virginia,
the only remaining pro-life Democrat in the U.S Senate in the current session, was arguably the
vote which caused the death of H.R. 3755 (as nearly each Republican member in the Senate
ascribes to the Pro-Life movement). The few pro-choice Republican Senators who currently

Foster, Mitchell 22
serve in the Senate, Senators Collins and Murkowski, did not vote in favor of the version of H.R.
3755 which reached the Senate floor. The group of senators who did not vote would likely not
have influenced the outcome of H.R. 3755, unless more Democrats in this subsection appeared
than Republicans. Third, the language of this bill, while similar to Roe v. Wade, in the extent to
which it would have protected one’s right to acquire an abortion, was sufficiently protective of
abortion rights to acquire not one bi-partisan vote in support of the proposed bill, other than the
two independent votes (which, as they caucus for the Democrats and are independent rather than
Republican, bi-partisan does not accurately convey their support on the matter). This bill would
have, however, gone far beyond the protections to access abortion provided by Roe, as well as
subsequent precedents and laws originating from the House and the Supreme Court, which have
acted to discount the protections in Roe alone, via effectively banning laws which act to restrict
access to abortion by a far greater standard (Israel 2021). Naturally, a vote to cloture would have
been merely a delay in the process, which may have led to the passage of the bill. Even still,
Democrats may attempt to write a new bill with language similar to H.R. 3755, and provided the
Democrats maintain a majority in the House and acquire one more supportive member of the bill
in the Senate, such a bill may pass. While true, we may well see a similar effort from the
Republicans in the near future if they can gain substantial seats in the House, hold their figure in
the Senate, and get a Republican president elected. This is merely a note, however, as such an
effort would take at least two years, though likely longer due to the position of the House of
Representatives currently.
Thus, as any assertions regarding the federal response to the repeal of Roe v. Wade would
be highly speculative, the state response is far easier to accurately depict. The basis by which we
can judge state response to the dissolution of federal protection for legal abortion is as follows:
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State laws which remain in effect, as they have since before Roe v. Wade, statutes which states
have signed into effect prior to the conclusion of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization, and the trigger laws states have signed, which will go into effect if Roe v. Wade is
overruled. The political leanings of state legislatures and gubernatorial positions within the states
must be considered in tandem, as any of these pieces of legislation are subject to change if party
control of government changes. Like the issue of contending with the political divisions in
Congress, many state legislators may be up for election shortly thereafter, or prior, depending on
when a repeal to Roe v. Wade goes into effect, and the position of a current legislature is
subsequently uncertain, if the majority is toppled in the given state legislature. That said, there is
no reason for us to believe that current legislatures will see substantial changes in their
populations. These shifts are merely a singular, minor, aspect for which we should tame our
expectations for legislative action in the distant future. Of course, we can expect even less
change in membership and political divisions within state supreme courts. The highest courts in
several states, including Maryland, California, and Montana, have ruled that abortion is
constitutionally protected based on the language of their state constitutions regarding various
clauses, though generally tethered to language protecting the right to privacy or protection of
procreative autonomy.
That said, state level legislation regarding the legality of abortion if Roe v. Wade is
overturned is a superb indicator of how access to abortion will change after June of this year.
While we would ideally analyze the related legislation for each state, we may, through analysis
of several states within each region of the United States, understand an extensive framework of
access to abortion within the country, without going into detail over each state during this thesis.
Through this section, we will cover, where relevant, the rulings of the highest courts within
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states, as the rulings of these courts reign supreme over the legislatures. Even in the cases where
the highest court of the state has ruled on abortion, state legislatures may continue to put forth
legislation aimed at restricting abortion. In fact, state legislatures may amend portions of their
state constitutions, often by simple majority, provided the voters approve it, as to surmount the
highest court’s interpretations of the state constitution regarding abortion (Marshfield 2019, 76–
77). While every state allows legislative amendments, and only Delaware allows these
amendments to go into effect without voter approval, several states allow constitutional
amendments to originate from an initiative or constitutional commissions to decide on
constitutional amendments, though these commissions are generally formed with popular
approval (Marshfield 2019, 76–80). With enough political control and public support, even
constitutional protections as interpreted by a state’s highest court may be repealed; this is
certainly an aspect worth consideration.
In states where the present highest court has ruled for protecting abortions rights, like
Montana, Florida, and Iowa, the state legislatures have, while attempts have been made to do so,
been largely unsuccessful in altering their state constitutions to allow for outright bans on
abortion. One of the most prevalent methods by which state legislatures limit access to abortion
is through Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers laws (TRAP laws) (Medoff 2010). These
laws, as they have grown in density over the years since Roe v. Wade, greatly damage access to
abortion within the law post 1973 via limiting who, how, and why prospective abortion providers
may provide abortions to their patients (Medoff 2010). As laws adjoined to TRAP laws often
limit funding and specify strict procedures which must occur prior to an abortion, these laws
assure that the process of acquiring an abortion is difficult for any prospective patient. If, say, a
woman can prove that she has a valid reason for the abortion and is certain that an abortion is the
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correct course of action through often lengthy, targeted waiting periods, then she must, prior to
any sort of Last Menstrual Period bans (LMP bans) present in the state at hand, travel often long
distances and wait in tremendous lines to acquire an abortion (Fuentes et al. 2020; Medoff 2010).
On that note, understanding these two subsections of laws, which the anti-abortion
advocates have pursued since Roe was decided, will prove paramount to understanding the
current political climate within the states prior to the Dobbs decision. TRAP laws, as their name
may imply, limit access to abortion via limiting the practices of those willing to provide abortion
procedures. These laws often target funding for abortion clinics and act to limit those who may
perform abortions, as most states have come to restrict this group to only those medically trained.
Procedure is another pressing aspect by which this legislation aims to restrict access to abortion,
like the Partial-Birth Abortion Act (2003) and subsequent passage of similar legislation against
D&X techniques. Clinics which provide abortions are often further restricted via requirements in
TRAP laws, which require the clinics to be held to the same standards of ambulatory surgical
centers, as to drive up the costs of the operations and exclude smaller practices (Austin and
Harper 2019, 375–76). Essentially, TRAP laws encapsulate many ways in which anti-abortion
representatives in state legislatures have been able to bypass the original protection against
excessive governmental restriction on access to abortion present in Roe.
Though these TRAP laws are significant, they appear to have not had as staunch an effect
on access to abortion as last menstrual period bans may soon. TRAP laws have acted to
inconvenience those seeking abortions more than anything. Research suggests that while laws
aimed at restricting abortion providers negatively affect access to abortion in states with them in
effect, the effect of TRAP laws on abortion rates is not substantial (Austin and Harper 2019,
377–78). In stark contrast, “LMP bans” have, and will have, a far more significant effect on
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one’s ability to acquire an abortion (Foster, Gould, and Biggs 2021, 642–46). This form of laws
target access to abortion via restricting when a woman can acquire an abortion. Rather than
judging the timing of this access based on the viability standard as lined out in Casey, proponents
of these bans opt for deciding when a woman can acquire an abortion based on how many weeks
it has been since they last experienced a period (Donovan 2020, 1–2). While many proponents of
bans on abortion prior to viability would prefer such bans to be based on weeks after conception
(so-called twenty-week bans reflect this ideology), LMP bans have the same effect. These
statutory restrictions greatly restrict access to abortion, especially for those who have never given
birth and/or were taking hormonal birth control in the month of the conception (Foster, Gould,
and Biggs 2021, 642–45). As we have previously delved into the impact of Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, TRAP laws have exploded in Midwestern and Southern
states, though they have also appeared in states outside these regions, as these laws are effective
in lowering abortion rates while not an outright ban on abortion at any time (Bentele, Sager, and
Aykanian 2018; Medoff 2010; Spitzer and Ellman 2021).
As I will rely on the information gathered by the following source several times, it must
be mentioned that the extensive gathering of research on laws which expanded abortion rights
and restricted abortion rights has proved extraordinarily helpful in understanding how access to
abortion will look directly following the overruling of Roe v. Wade. Though for the purposes of
this thesis, I will not delve into the specifics of each state’s legislative efforts to either bolster or
degrade access to abortion, the reader should feel implored to, if they should desire specifics on a
state not covered in depth in this thesis, venture to the webpage of the Center for Productive
Rights as a better culmination of research on the subject does not exist elsewhere.3 With that
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noted, the following section will lay out specifics of several states within each region of the
United States, and its territories, thereby giving the reader an in-depth understanding as to how
access to abortion will look nationally after June this year.

Section 3.1 – Access to Abortion on the West Coast
The West Coast, as it has grown into a progressive stronghold over the last several
decades, is universal in its protection to legal abortion in the case that the protections of Roe v.
Wade fall. Starting in the northern-most state, in 1991 Washington adopted a ballot measure
which protects a woman’s fundamental right to acquire an abortion,4 except as limited by the
state’s post-viability ban on abortions,5 without discrimination. Moreover, in 1992 the
Washington legislature repealed its pre-Roe statutes, thereby removing any ban against abortion
in their laws.6 In the past two decades, starting in 2004, Washington has, by several statutes
proposed and cemented into law, acted to protect access to abortion by: Authorizing trained
health care providers to provide abortion care,7 prohibiting interference in this abortion care,8
providing public funding for abortions and abortion care,9 requiring that insurance companies
provide funding for abortions and abortion care for those who are insured under their plans (even
the most basic renditions of their plans),10 prohibiting interference of abortion clinics,11 and

4

Wash. Admin. Code §§ 9.02.100, 9.02.110, 9.02.140, 9.02.160.
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prohibiting prosecution of those who provide abortions as well as those who receive abortions.12
This assures that Washington will certainly protect access to abortion in nearly all cases.
Washington is by all measures the most restrictive state in the matter of abortion within
the West coast (by a small margin); California, while it has a similar viability standard which, if
broken, could result in civil or criminal charges against those who were involved with the
abortion,13 and Oregon, though it does have a similar statute which requires reporting of
abortions, have fewer restrictions to abortion than Washington.14 Some have unsuccessfully
attempted to interpret the Equal Rights Amendment (2014) in Oregon, as initiated by the voters
of Oregon to protect one’s fundamental right to abortion;15 however, the clearest legislation
which protects abortion in Oregon comes from the Oregon Health Authority, Oregon Legislature,
and cases in which the Oregon Supreme Court has struck down administrative attempts to cut
funding to clinics which provide abortion (Monthey 2019).16 California is rather distinctive in
comparison to Oregon and Washington. While all three provide extensive protections to access
to abortion and limited restriction, the California Supreme Court, four years prior to Roe,
recognized a right to procreative choice under the state’s constitution.17 This right was further
developed via a constitutional amendment one’s right to privacy and liberty protect their right to
acquire an abortion.18 Thus, any law which acts to restrict abortion, other than abortion after
viability, is unconstitutional; one notable challenge to this constitutional right is the California
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law which requires that minors seeking abortion must acquire the approval of a parent or
guardian, though this law is known to be unconstitutional and, therefore, is unenforced.19 In
summary, the West Coast will likely see no change to access to abortion within its borders, other
than likely higher incidents of abortion tourism, as Oregon has special provisions funding
travelers seeking abortion and Planned Parenthood is especially active in the states of this region
(Monthey 2019).
That said, prior to Roe Oregon was not an abortion destination partially due to
geographical distance for those which desired abortion and will desire abortion when bans on
abortion come into effect yet again. New York, which provided eighty-four-percent of known
abortions acquired outside of one’s state of residence, had the greatest access to abortion relative
to distance from states where access was most limited prior to Roe (Joyce, Tan, and Zhang 2012,
10–12). Kansas, for those who reside in states which lacked access to abortion prior to Roe and
as restrictive laws have evolved west of the Appalachian mountains, proved a far more viable
option for those seeking abortion than states farther away with out-of-state abortion tourists
acquiring sixty-four-percent of the known abortion procedures within the state (Joyce, Tan, and
Zhang 2012, 8–10). Though flights for those seeking abortions which live in states where it will
likely become far more difficult to acquire abortions after Roe falls have become less expensive
than the late twentieth century, most seeking abortions will still likely, due to factors financial
and temporal, opt for abortion-protected states closer in mileage; even with more than thirty
states likely to ban abortion in most cases, the average female seeking abortion in states which
will ban abortion will have to travel about one-hundred-fifty-seven more miles than the current
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Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123450, invalidated by Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 16
Cal. 4th 307, 436-45, 940 P.2d 797, 883-89 (1997).
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figure of around thirty miles (Joyce, Tan, and Zhang 2012, 22). This jump, while massive in
considering those who will be most affected by bans on abortion are the most impoverished
persons (who may lack access to an automobile or money for plane tickets), is not as major as
one may assume, in the face of more than half of the states of the United States banning abortion,
due to pocket states like New Mexico or Kansas (Joyce, Tan, and Zhang 2012, 22).

Section 3.2 – Access to Abortion in the Southwest
Directly to the East lies the American Southwest, which has generally acted to restrict or
prohibit abortion in the case that the Supreme Court revokes the protections of Roe, wherein
bordering states with legislation in place to protect abortion will prove quite helpful to women in
these states seeking access to abortion. Utah, dating back to 1973 with revisions to its criminal
code which contained language banning abortion, has long fought abortion via restrictive
legislation. In recent years, the Utah state legislature has signed into effect several bans on
abortion during the last thirty years, from one at viability to a total ban. That said, only the
viability ban has remained in effect,20 as federal courts have enjoined bans earlier in the abortion
timeline.21 Notably, the Utah state legislature has, with no protections present in its constitution
or statutory law, stated its policy preference as one aimed at protection of “unborn children.”22
Thus, the following laws which Utah has passed to restrict access to abortion may come as no
shock to the reader: A ban on abortions after eighteen weeks LMP,23 an outright ban on
abortion,24 a ban on the use of D&X and saline abortion methods,25 a ban on midwives as
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providers of abortion care,26 and extensive TRAP laws.27 These TRAP laws range from
restrictions on who and which clinics may provide abortions, limit public funding and insurance
coverage for abortion related care, and required reporting. 28 Given the already quite limited
access to abortion, though federal district courts have fought to protect access to abortion in Utah
thus far and having enacted a trigger ban in 2020 which will prohibit abortion in nearly every
case if Roe is overturned, Utah will certainly act to ban or heavily restrict access to abortion
within their territory.
Having never repealed its pre-Roe ban on abortion, Utah’s southern neighbor is similar in
this regard.29 Arizona has passed similar bans on abortion to Utah, though not as far as a total ban
since before Roe, at fifteen-weeks and twenty-weeks LMP. 30 The only temporally based ban
which Arizona, as federal courts have intervened thus far, is currently allowed to maintain is one
at viability. 31 Otherwise, Arizona has gone on to prohibit D&X abortions,32 prohibit abortions
sought for characteristics of the potential offspring (currently disability, due to a Ninth Circuit
Court ruling, remains a valid reason enjoining that facet of the ban),33 and institute many other
laws aimed at restricting access to abortion. These efforts range from biased counseling and
required viewing of the ultrasound for the prospective recipient of an abortion to limited public
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funding and insurance coverage for abortion-related care. 34 Essentially, though the Arizona state
legislature did repeal a ban which allowed for criminal penalties for those who opt to selfmanage abortions in 2021 and does not currently have a trigger law set to go into effect when
Roe is overturned,35 we may expect that Arizona will act to severely limit access to abortion or
ban it outright given the resultant judgment for the Mississippi decision.
While these two states are nearly certain to ban abortion when Roe is overturned, the fate
of New Mexico is not as clear. Though New Mexico has banned D&X abortions,36 retains
various TRAP laws,37 and maintains a reporting requirement for abortions to the state,38 the New
Mexican 55th legislature is repealing much of the legislation aimed at restricting access to
abortion, namely its pre-Roe ban in 2021.39 The highest court of New Mexico has, while the state
legislature is acting against legislation aimed at restricting or banning abortion, not ruled in
support of or against one’s fundamental right to acquire an abortion within the state, while there
lies an Equal Rights Amendment within their constitution which may be argued to protection this
right.40 Thus, while the New Mexican state legislature repeals laws like its age-based abortion
reporting law and its law restricting who may provide abortion care,41 the highest court of New
Mexico has yet to produce a verdict in support of legal abortion. Abortion is in a state of limbo,
then, as the court may come out against legal abortion after Roe is overturned; the language of
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the New Mexican constitution is generally more supportive of one’s right to privacy and equal
treatment. Even still, the court’s decision on the matter will either render abortion protected by
the constitution of New Mexico or simply not. Thus, as long as the legislature remains
supportive of legal abortion and protecting access to abortion, abortion will remain legal within
the state.
With only one state in the region left, we may shift focus to a state which will likely
protect access to abortion within its territory: Nevada. Though this state retains a ban on
abortions after twenty-four weeks post-fertilization (twenty-six weeks LMP),42 its voters passed a
1990 referendum which provides statutory protection for abortion, which may only be repealed
by another successful referendum.43 The state legislature within Nevada, while it repealed
unenforced pre-Roe bans left in Nevada state law since 1973 in 2019,44 has recently passed
legislation aimed at restricting access to abortion; These restrictions range from the
aforementioned prohibition at viability,45 limiting of public funding for abortion,46 minorabortion notification requirement (temporarily enjoined),47 reporting requirements,48 and a
restriction of who may provide abortion care to those medically licensed.49 Overall, restrictions
to abortion are not immense in Nevada and access to abortion has remained relatively unfazed by
these restrictions, as prospective recipients of abortion who should face risk of death in acquiring
an abortion past viability have generally been allowed to do so within Nevada. As it would be
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quite difficult to reach a popular referendum against abortion and the population of Nevada
would be generally opposed to this, abortion will remain legal with some protection within
Nevada for the near future.

Section 3.3 – Access to Abortion in the Rocky Mountains
In the Rocky Mountain region, the states are mixed in how they will respond to a repeal
of SCOTUS’ protected access to abortion nationally. While their legislative and executive
branches have put forth legislation aimed at restricting access to abortion, Montana’s highest
court has opted to constitutionally protect one’s right to procreative autonomy through language
which protects an individual’s right to privacy and right to procreative autonomy in the state
Constitution of Montana.50 The restrictions, of which several are enjoined, presently employed in
Montana act to: prohibit abortion to a twenty-week standard (enjoined) as well as at viability,51
prohibit intact D&X abortions,52 require a twenty-four-hour waiting period (temporarily
enjoined) as well as biased counseling (temporarily enjoined),53 require that prospective
recipients of abortion procedures be provided the opportunity to view an ultrasound (temporarily
enjoined),54 require that abortions for minors be disclosed to parents or legal guardians (though a
judge may bypass this requirement),55 and prohibits remote medical care involving abortion
(temporarily enjoined).56 Thus, if Roe is undermined or repealed in its entirety, we can expect
that the Montana state legislature, along with gubernatorial support, will attempt to lift these
injunctions and sign in new laws aimed at restricting access to abortion. Montana’s Supreme
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Court, however, will continue to block legislative action, protect public funding for abortion
procedures and clinics which provide abortions, and ensure clinics are able to operate without
obstruction.57 The process by which the Supreme Court of Montana has enjoined abortion
restrictive laws is judicial review and is the primary way in which state supreme courts have
fought anti-abortion legislation. Though the state supreme courts have the power to determine
the constitutionality of legislation within their given jurisdiction, legislatures may override such
judicial interpretations or simply write new statutes, provided the circumstances allow. An
override at this level often requires a two-thirds majority within both houses and that the judicial
decision blocking the given law be deemed not rooted in the state’s constitution. Otherwise,
change in membership, of the highest court of Montana, would more easily facilitate such
alterations to their judgment; with either option, we may be relatively sure that abortion will
remain protected for some time.
Like Montana, Colorado will protect access to abortion, with some restrictions. Primarily,
these restrictions are in public funding and in mandatory reporting of abortions to the state,58 as
well as parents and guardians (unless the judge approves a minor’s petition against this
notification);59 there have been attempts, though unsuccessful thus far, through legislative ballot
initiative to institute a twenty-two-week last menstrual period (LMP) ban on abortions
(Freiburger 2020).60 As this specific attempt, in 2020, was voted down by Colorado voters by a
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seven percent margin, it is unclear as to how future ballot initiatives may play a role in restrictive
legislation in Colorado (Freiburger 2020). While the highest court of Colorado has not acted to
protect abortion via the constitution, the state legislature enacted a statute in 2022 which protects
a woman’s right to abortion and contraception as a fundamental right, thereby protecting their
ability to make personal decisions related at any stage of the pregnancy.61 Currently, Colorado
has no legislation which restricts who may provide abortion care, though they must be a health
care practitioner of some sort;62 protections for abortion clinics, as affirmed by the highest court
in Colorado in 2000, are present in Colorado, as well.63
Contrary to these two states, Idaho and Wyoming have both signed into law trigger bans
which will effectively ban abortion in its entirety if Roe v. Wade is weakened or entirely
overturned.64 Moreover, both states require reporting of abortions amongst several other piece of
legislation which are aimed at limiting a woman’s access to abortion currently.65 Wyoming does
not currently restrict access to abortion as severely as Idaho, though it does so via prohibition of
most abortions past viability,66 required viewership of ultrasound,67 required parental consent
(unless the minor at hand acquires the approval of a petition from a judge),68 procedures limited
to licensed physicians, and certain criminal penalties for those who fail to act within these
limitations.69 Idaho, as it has mirrored much of its legislative efforts on Texas, has signed into
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law a six-week LMP ban on abortion,70 alongside a private right to action which allows citizens
to report persons who act outside of the realm of the law (temporarily enjoined),71 and a twenty
week post-fertilization ban (enjoined).72 Prospective recipients of abortions must, after they
request that they be allowed to acquire an abortion, wait twenty-four-hours and proceed through
counseling aimed at changing their mind.73 Clinics in Idaho are, distinctive from Wyoming,
subject to many TRAP laws. From restrictions to who may provide abortions to a ban on
telemedicine visits for any provider regarding abortion-related appointments, access to abortion
in Idaho is rather limited currently as compared to its neighboring states.74 Wyoming, though it
does not share in TRAP laws to the extent of Idaho, does currently enjoy similar requirements
for abortion providers and limits public funding for abortions.75 In summary of the Rocky
Mountain region, Idaho and Wyoming will likely ban abortion while Montana and Colorado will
likely protect access to abortion. Montana’s state legislature, however, has proven itself an
enemy to abortion in recent years, starting in 2021, so we may see further TRAP laws and LMP
bans passed in Montana; by legislative or popular innovative, there may potentially arise an
amendment to the language in the state’s constitution which protects one’s procreative
autonomy. Until then, access within these four states appears to be predictable.
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Section 3.4 – Access to Abortion in the Midwest
Moving further east, the Midwest region has somewhat mixed legislation, largely due to
the language of their state constitutions and the political leanings of their state legislatures in the
last two decades. As a region which leans conservative, the debate has been rather intense
regarding abortion of late. North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Missouri, Wisconsin, Indiana,
and Ohio all represent states which will likely prohibit abortion; the only states in the Midwest
wherein, by virtue of the highest courts of their lands, abortion will remain legal are as follows:
Illinois, Minnesota, Iowa, and Kansas. One curious case in conceiving of the Midwestern states
is Michigan, as a Michigan Court of Claims issued an injunction against the Michigan pre-Roe
ban from 1931.76 Prior to this action, the Michigan courts had not issued a verdict in support of
legal abortion so this ruling may represent a notable change in how Michigan treats abortion
post-Roe. The majority of the Michigan legislature is currently supportive of banning abortion as
best it may, while the state’s Governor, Gretchen Whitmer, appears to be pursuing anything in
her power to retain legal abortion within the state post Roe, like issuing strategically filing the
suit for which this judgment was rendered (McKenna 2022, 22–23). Look to the later
commentary on Wisconsin for specifics as to how Michigan has legislated against abortion prior
to this action as the two states, Michigan and Wisconsin, were to respond quite similarly to a
repeal to Roe, prior to the repeal of Michigan’s Pre-Roe abortion ban.
Though many of the Midwestern states which are likely to ban abortion have not enacted
such laws yet, a few of these states have enacted trigger bans set to go into effect after Roe v.
Wade is overturned. North Dakota and South Dakota, in 2007 and 2005 respectively, enacted
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trigger bans which would make abortion illegal in nearly all cases, with exception for the life of
the mother;77 Missouri, in 2019, passed a similar trigger ban, which would render abortion
providers felons if they were to perform abortions after federal protections are no longer in place
(Linton 2007; Sommers 2021).78 Both North and South Dakota, as with nearly all of these states
which will likely severely limit access to abortion or ban it altogether, have acted to hinder
access to abortion prior to these trigger bans going into effect. With telemedicine bans,79 reason
bans,80 method bans (dilation and extraction, like the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban),81 twenty-twoweek LMP bans,82 and TRAP restrictive laws,83 access to abortion has been quite limited within
these two states for some time. As per statutory law which act to restrict abortion through TRAP
laws, the Dakotas require counseling prior to one’s ability to acquire an abortion,84 required
reporting,85 and a waiting period prior to an abortion after initial consultation;86 one may notice,
in most states likely to act to ban abortion have, prior to any hints of a repeal to Roe v. Wade,
signed into law several statutes which contain similar language.
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N.D. Cent. Code § 14–02.1-05.2(1). S.D. Codified Laws § 22-17-5.1.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.017(4).
79
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-03.5(5). S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-56; H.B. 1318, 97th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (SD 2022).
80
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-04.1(1)(b). S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-63 to 34-23A-64. Id. §§
34-23A-89 to 34-23A-93.
81
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.6-02(1), 14-02.1-04.2(2). S.D. Codified Laws §§ 34-23A-27 to 3423A-33.
82
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-05.3(3). S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-5.
83
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-04(1-4 and 7), invalidated by Miks v. Olson, No. CIV. A3-82-78,
1983 WL 869578, at *1 (D.N.D. Aug. 25, 1983). S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-51; S.D. Admin.
R. art. 44:67.
84
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-02(11)(a)(2); id. §14-02.1-02(11)(b)(5), invalidated by Am. Med.
Ass’n v. Stenehjem, 412 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D.N.D. 2019). S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1; §
34-23A-56.
85
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-07. S.D. Codified Laws §§ 34-23A-34 to 34-23A-42. Id. § 3423A-19.
86
N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-02.1-03(1), 14-02.1-02(11)(a). S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1; §
34-23A-56.
78

Foster, Mitchell 40
Ohio, for example, has numerous bans on abortion which aim to greatly limit one’s
ability to acquire an abortion within the state. Abortions past six-weeks LMP are banned in Ohio
(preliminarily enjoined),87 and abortions past twenty-weeks post fertilization are banned in the
state.88 Procedure bans, both D&E (enjoined) and D&X,89 are in place in Ohio and abortions
sought due to Down syndrome are banned.90 Women seeking abortion within Ohio must undergo
a twenty-four hour waiting period,91 biased counseling,92 and no insurance coverage,93 or public
funding, for acquiring an abortion. Minors seeking abortion within Ohio must acquire the
approval of a judge or parent to do so and the state enforces several TRAP laws.94 As with many
states which are generally act against abortion, Ohio, in 2020, attempted to ban abortion care
entirely via executive order in a purported attempt to suspend non-essential procedures during
the COVID-19 Pandemic.95 Though this action was quickly enjoined by the Southern District of
Ohio Court, it is further evidence suggesting that Ohio will act to ban abortion as Roe is
overturned.96 Furthermore, the state’s policy preference is one which aims to support crisis
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pregnancy centers, buildings wherein prospective recipients of abortion are guilted into keeping
an unwanted pregnancy under false pretenses, with public funding.97
One state within the region which has formally signed into law a trigger ban on abortion,
which would ban abortion in nearly all situations if the protections of Roe were no longer in
effect, is Missouri.98 This state has passed a ban on abortions past eight-weeks LMP (temporarily
enjoined),99 a ban on abortions after viability,100 and prohibits D&X abortions.101 Women
seeking abortion must not do so for reasons of sex, race, or Down syndrome present in the fetus
and must wait a seventy-four-hour waiting period prior to acquiring an abortion.102 Prospective
recipients of abortion procedures must receive biased counseling,103 be offered an ultrasound,104
and, in the case of minors, acquire parental consent in order to acquire an abortion.105 Abortion
care is further limited via limits on public funding,106 private insurance of coverage of abortion
care,107 and TRAP laws;108 telemedicine bans and reporting requirements are present in Missouri
law.109 While Missouri will almost certainly act to ban abortion, in nearly all cases, after the Roe
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v. Wade is overruled, access to abortion will likely shift little after this legal change. As is this
the case with many states which will act to ban abortion after Roe is overruled, access to abortion
within the state is already quite limited via the expansive legislation restricting abortion.
Wisconsin and Nebraska are quite similar in this sense.
Wisconsin prohibits abortion at twenty-weeks post-fertilization,110 after viability,111 and
when performed via D&X procedures, though this ban has been rendered unconstitutional.112
Those who desire to acquire abortions must undergo the very same twenty-four-hour waiting
period prior to abortion, biased counseling, and viewership of ultrasound, eminent throughout
states of the south.113 TRAP laws are, also, expansive within the state, from transfer agreements
to mandatory reporting of abortions to the state.114 Telemedicine is banned within Wisconsin,
public funding or private insurance coverage for abortion-related services is limited, and minor’s
seeking abortion must do so with the consent of a parent, adult family member, or judge.115
Though Wisconsin’s gubernatorial position is currently held by governor supportive of abortion
rights, the state is likely to ban abortion in nearly every case. This is clear through the plethora of
laws which act to restrict abortion and the pre-Roe ban which remains present in the state’s
statutory law, a law which is interpreted to apply in charging those who commit “feticide.”116
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Though Nebraska has repealed its pre-Roe ban on abortion and has not signed into a law
a trigger law which will act to ban abortion after the Dobbs decision, the state’s restrictive
legislation is immensely similar to Wisconsin and the populace appears to be generally
supportive of banning abortion. Nebraska’s ban on D&E procedures in 2020 supplemented an
earlier unconstitutional ban, which the state has never amended, on D&X abortions.117 Moreover,
Nebraska has prohibited abortion at twenty-weeks post-fertilization and at viability.118 Minors
must acquire the consent of a parent or judge to acquire an abortion and telemedicine is not legal
within the state when dealing with abortion-care.119 Pregnant people seeking abortion must
undergo a twenty-four-hour waiting period prior to acquiring an abortion, biased counseling, and
viewership of an ultrasound longer than an hour prior to the abortion procedure.120 This state,
with limited public funding and private health insurance for abortion on the client-side,121 has
several TRAP laws in effect. Nebraska will likely act to prohibit abortion outright if Roe is
overturned, though such a ban would not go into effect until the Nebraskan legislature signs it
into law. Alongside Nebraska, Indiana holds primarily the same laws which act to restrict access
to abortion. Notable differences between the two are Indiana’s reason ban and the fact that
Indiana’s D&X ban is currently in effect,122 while Nebraska’s D&E ban is in effect and the
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opposites are enjoined in the according states.123 Past these distinctions, there is little difference
in the state law against abortion between these two states; Indiana will likely act to ban abortion
after Roe is overturned, though the relevant legislation has not yet been signed into law as trigger
law or otherwise.
Converse to the rest of the states within the Midwest, the following states will generally
continue to protect one’s right to acquire an abortion after Roe is overturned: Iowa, Minnesota,
Kansas, and Illinois. I say “generally” because several of these states may alter their current
standing after Roe is overturned. While all four states’ Supreme Courts have ruled in favor of
protecting one’s right to acquire an abortion, Iowa and Kansas both retain excessive restriction to
one’s access to abortion. Iowa prohibits abortion at six-weeks LMP, eighteen-weeks LMP, and in
the third trimester, though all of these bans were permanently enjoined by an Iowa District
Court.124 The Iowan legislature, along with gubernatorial approvement, has signed into law
several TRAP laws, COVID-19 related bans on restrictions on abortion as a “non-essential”
procedure, and limitations to public funding for abortions.125 Kansas has signed into law similar
bans on abortion, from those on D&X and D&E abortions to those on abortions sought for
reasons of sex selection, as compared to state which will likely ban abortion after Roe is
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overturned.126 As lawmakers within Iowa are likely to do, the Congress of Kansas has passed
legislation which will put up to a popular vote a constitutional amendment which would affirm
that the Kansas Constitution has no protection for one’s right to acquire an abortion, which will
go to a vote in August 2022.127 Minnesota still retains laws which require women seeking
abortion to undergo a twenty-four-hour waiting period prior to acquiring an abortion, as well as
biased counseling.128 Though the state does retain a viability ban and retain limited TRAP laws,
these restrictions are certainly not excessive and the highest court of Minnesota has been
enjoining laws which act to restrict one’s access to abortion since 1995.129 Illinois has very few
restrictive laws against abortion and, in 2019 placed into law a statutory protection for abortion
as a fundamental right to women within the state.130 Prior this decision, the Illinois legislature
has signed into law a trigger ban in 2017 which would have prohibited abortion in the case that
Roe were overturned.131 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has ruled in favor of the later law
which will protect one’s right to acquire an abortion;132 thus, Illinois will certainly continue to
protect one’s right to acquire an abortion after Roe is overturned. The same is likely true of
Minnesota; in the short term, we may expect this to be true of Kansas and Iowa though their
respective legislatures will actively fight the protections provided by their state constitutions.
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Section 3.5 – Access to Abortion in the South
A region with less room for bipartisan debate of value, the South, has become the
stronghold for legislation which bans abortion outright in nearly all occasions. From Texas to
Georgia, these states have all signed legislation which aims to ban abortion outright if Roe is
overturned, though several of these states have acted outside of the realm of the protections
central to Roe v. Wade since the date of the original judgment. In this section, Texas and Florida,
though they have generally remained outside of the description of “the South,” will be analyzed
as they are both geographically Southern and have both generally fought against legal abortion.
Texas, having largely developed novel legislation aimed at restricting access to abortion, and
Florida, having instituted a fifteen-week LMP ban this year while the highest Floridian court has
found abortion to be constitutionally protected, certainly represent distinctive states within the
region when considering this political issue.
Alongside Florida, Virginia is the only state which will not likely act to outright ban
abortion. Though there lie no state-level statutory or constitutionally interpreted protection for
abortion within Virginia; both states very well may, as popular support is likely strong enough
within Florida to amend the state’s constitution and the Virginian legislature faces no boundary
in its potential to ban abortion if Roe is overturned, act to ban abortion though they have not yet
done so. Considering these two states, what we may be more certain of is the fact that abortion
is, and will be, restricted soon.
Virginia, though the state’s legislative branch is currently the most Democrat-dominated
it has been since 1996, currently prohibits most abortions after the second trimester of a
pregnancy unless three physicians agree that the abortion is entirely medically necessary to save
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the life or health of the recipient of the abortion. 133 Currently, D&X abortions are prohibited and
public funding for abortion services is limited within the state. 134 There also lies a mandate,
though judge approval supersedes this if it is acquired, for parental or guardian notification prior
to a minor’s abortion; Virginia had several TRAP laws in effect prior to their being enjoined by
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in 2019, which cited Casey and Roe in
their judgment. 135 In 2017, Virginian House of Representatives stated its express policy
preference as one set on banning abortion outright and held the anniversary of Roe as a “Day of
Tears.” 136 While all of this infers Virginia will likely ban abortion, the Virginian legislature has
passed several pieces of legislation repealing many of the state’s restrictions on access to
abortion, namely its TRAP provisions, and protection for abortion clinics. 137 This is, again, due
to the current Democratic majority in the legislative branch of Virginia’s state government,
though it is worth noting that it appears as though a slim majority of the voters within Virginia
are supportive of this legislative action. If only a gap of a few years led to complete platform
change of the Virginia state legislature, we can only be sure that this legislative effort exists for
the near foreseeable future.
While Virginia’s Supreme Court has not interpreted the Virginian state constitution to
protect one’s right to acquire an abortion, the Floridian Supreme Court has done so. 138 This
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protection, though partially based upon the “undue burden” test provided by Casey, is primarily
derived from language within the Florida State Constitution, specifically its right to privacy
clause.139 Even still, the highest court of Florida has not utilized judicial review to enjoin most of
the state legislature’s statutory abortion restrictive legislation. One instance of their highest court
responding to the state legislature was their judgment regarding the legislature’s ban of the
following procedures, as this ban clearly constituted undue burden: Dilation and evacuation
(D&E), D&X, and labor induction procedures.140 Restrictive laws which remain intact, however,
are numerous. The state of Florida will prohibit abortion at fifteen-week-LMP 141 in July this year
and viability currently, while many states which have attempted such bans have seen their laws
enjoined.142 Those who seek abortion within Florida must wait twenty-four-hours prior to
acquiring an abortion, must acquire biased counseling, and must view an ultrasound.143
Moreover, they may not acquire an abortion through health insurance,144 they may not acquire an
abortion via public funding,145 and minors seeking abortion must, by supporting language in their
state constitution, deal with mandatory parental notification (unless they acquire a judge’s
approval to forgo this aspect)146; the clinics providing abortion are, also, quite restricted by
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numerous TRAP laws, from admitting privileges to those who may provide abortion services in
the various stages of pregnancy.147 Abortion is quite restricted in Florida and, as the fifteen-week
LMP ban was signed in this year, current lawmakers within the state are supportive of banning
abortion to the fullest extent that they may. Republicans and pro-life Democrats represent a
majority, nearly two-thirds in both their House and their Senate, in the state legislature and the
majority voters of Florida support banning abortion. Either by ballot or legislature initiative and
popular approval, Florida may go on to navigate around the protection of abortion provided by
the Florida Supreme Court, though this may take time. For the foreseeable future, Florida and
Virginia will remain the only states in the South to keep abortion legal, though heavily restricted.
As for the other states of the South, nearly total bans on abortion are on the books for
when the protections of Roe are amended. Texas and Oklahoma, consistent with the abortionrestrictive law in Idaho, are nearly identical in their restrictive legislation against abortion, with
fewer laws enjoined in Texas than Oklahoma. Both states prohibit abortion in nearly every case
at six weeks LMP with enforcement via private right to action.148 The S.B. 8 Texas law which I
mentioned earlier in speaking of Idaho’s private right to action (though it remains enjoined
currently),149 relies upon private citizens reporting those who acquire or provide abortions past
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the given six-week LMP deadline, known commonly as Heartbeat abortion bans. Texas, also, has
a ban on abortion at twenty-week post-fertilization, or twenty-two-weeks-LMP. 150
Notably, the Supreme Court of the United States, in its judgment regarding Whole
Woman’s Health v. Jackson (2021), did not strike down the Texas S.B. 8 law, though it allowed
the pre-enforcement challenge to Texas’ Senate Bill 8 to proceed against certain defendants.151
Notably, U.S. v. Texas (2021), a secondary case filed by the Biden administration and petitioners
to maintain the injunction brought forth by a US District Court judge within Texas, was
dismissed as the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted (Cohen, Adashi, and Gostin 2021,
1474). From these two cases, the essential takeaway is that petitioners of the law may not sue
judges of the state’s courts, nor clerks, as the state is protected from lawsuits under the Eleventh
Amendment and these persons are not adverse litigants.152 The Supreme Court’s judgment
regarding Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson is particularly vital in understanding how other
states have been able to pass bans on abortion earlier than viability, undermining Roe and Casey;
rather than striking down a bill which clearly undermines the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court,
the SCOTUS majority ignored this aspect of the bill as it was brought forth in both
aforementioned cases. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Sotomayor (seconded by Justices Breyer
and Kagan) both wrote opinions commenting on the fact that S.B. 8 effectively nullifies the
court’s rulings and, as Sotomayor expanded upon this point, invites other states to follow in
Texas’ lead in undermining the rulings of the Supreme Court.153 Thus, Whole Woman’s Health v.
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Jackson may represent, partially anyway, the beginning of the end to Roe (Cohen, Adashi, and
Gostin 2021).
Past Texas and Oklahoma, a few other states in the south have passed six-week-LMP
abortion bans, though none of these bans are active until Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health is
concluded, as enjoined by their courts. Louisiana,154 Georgia,155 South Carolina,156 Tennessee,157
Mississippi,158 and Kentucky have all passed bans at six-weeks.159 All six of these states differ
slightly in the status of their courts on the matter and on the specific restrictive statutes they have
signed into law. Some states, though, have gone a bit further in their efforts to restrict access to
abortion; Louisiana,160 Arkansas,161 Alabama,162 and Oklahoma163 have all signed into law bans
abortion outright, though enjoined currently. Nearly each one of these states, as well as North
Carolina with a ban on abortions after twenty-weeks LMP,164 ban abortion for several other
reasons and maintain bans at varying ranges in law. Overall, the ten states that I mentioned
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within this paragraph are quite similar in legislation against abortion. Most of these laws, due to
the fact that S.B 8 was not struck down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Whole
Woman’s Health v. Jackson (amongst other previously mentioned challenges to Roe after 2003),
were signed into law in the past five years. Most of these states employ vast TRAP laws, laws
restricting telemedicine, laws which police the process by which women acquire abortions and
bans on various procedures by which abortions are performed. Most pressing is the fact that
these ten states will almost certainly act to ban abortion outright after Roe is repealed, via preRoe bans on abortion, trigger laws, and by future legislation not yet signed into law by
legislators. Citizens of these states who desire to acquire abortions will need to travel to states
which will provide legal abortions or risk their health in acquiring illegal abortions nearby.
Primarily, the lowest economic class of women within this region, as well as in any state which
will act to prohibit abortion post-Roe, will experience the brunt of the effects of Dobbs v. Whole
Woman’s Health Organization.

Section 3.6 – Access to Abortion in the Northeast
To the northeast, we may look upon the Mid-Atlantic and New England regions which,
except for one state which was the first to put forth legislation banning abortion and the state
which was the last to sign in such legislation, have aligned nearly universally in their actions to
protect legal abortion without federally mandated protection. Pennsylvania and New Hampshire,
the members of this region which make it “nearly universal,” do not currently have legislation in
place which will act to ban abortion though, as both states have enacted several laws restricting
access to abortion in recent years, will likely restrict access to abortion further. In the case of
Pennsylvania, a ban to abortion outright may occur, as much of the Pennsylvanian legislature is
currently supportive of this action. If Governor Tom Wolf is replaced with a governor less
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supportive of legal abortion we can expect anti-abortion legislation to prevail (Gallagher 2018).
Otherwise, per the language of several Pennsylvania constitutional statutes as put forth by the
Pennsylvanian state legislature less than a decade after Roe v. Wade, it is the express legislative
agenda within the state of Pennsylvania to protect the “health of the child subject to abortion” as
well as the “health of the woman subject to abortion” to the highest extent of the law.165 This
mission, though stated decades ago, remains evident through abortion-related restrictive
legislation in Pennsylvania; notable examples include: A twenty-four week LMP ban on
abortion,166 a ban on abortions for the reason of sex,167 a mandatory day waiting period prior
after inquiry of abortion,168 a mandate for prospective recipients of abortion to undergo
counseling prior to acquiring an abortion,169 a limit on public funding and insurance coverage for
abortion,170 a mandate which requires consent from a parental entity for a minor to acquire an
abortion, and various TRAP laws.171
As for the other state which will act against meaningful access to abortion after Roe is
overturned, New Hampshire has quite similar legislation to Pennsylvania, though not to the
degree of Pennsylvania. Primarily through House Bills and alterations to their revenue statues,
the New Hampshire’s current legislative population has signed into law several pieces of
legislation restrictive to access to abortion. This wave of legislation appears to have gained
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traction after the elections of 2020, when the population shifted drastically from a state congress
dominated by pro-choice Democrats to pro-life Republicans and continued to this day. The state
prohibits abortions at and after twenty-four weeks LMP,172 prohibits D&X abortions,173 and
requires that illegal D&X procedures, or abortions after twenty-four weeks LMP, are reported to
the state.174 New Hampshire limits public funding,175 requires that the parents of minors
acquiring abortions are notified unless the minor has acquired judge approval to forgo this
notification and restricts those who are permitted to provide abortions and relevant aftercare.176
All of this anti-abortion legislation notwithstanding, voters passed into effect an amendment
which expressly states one’s right to privacy within the state in 2018;177 though the state’s
Supreme Court has not rendered an opinion as to if this amendment protects one’s right to
acquire an abortion, this was the intention behind voters and legislators like in passing this
amendment to the Constitution of New Hampshire. Thus, it is unclear as to how the issue of
abortion will develop in the following months. While Pennsylvania will likely ban abortion after
Roe is overturned by the Dobbs decision, abortion will remain legal, though not directly legally
protected, within the state of New Hampshire.
Past New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, each other state of the region, as well as
Washington D.C., will act to protect access to abortion post Roe. Though only a few of these
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states’ Supreme Courts, Massachusetts and New Jersey, have found that one’s right to acquire an
abortion is protected per language present in their state constitutions, northeastern states have
primarily acted to protect legal abortion via statutory law. The significance of this discrepancy,
while not vital in the short term, is that these laws would be far less difficult to repeal by future
sessions of state legislatures, than say constitutional interpretations provided by state supreme
courts or constitutional amendments initiated or confirmed by popular vote. Moreover, this is
simply an aspect which researchers of the subject must consider in gauging how substantial a
state’s access to abortion will be without the current framework of Roe.
On this same note, a few of the northeastern states which will act to protect access to
abortion post Roe are distinctive as compared to the others. Maryland, Delaware, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Maine will retain greater abortion-restrictive legislation as compared to New
York, New Jersey, Connecticut and Vermont. Maryland, for example, will still require parental
notification of a minor’s abortion, unless their physician waives this notice upon their request,
and various TRAP laws.178 As extended by a Maryland House Bill in 2022, the state does protect
abortion via both express statutory protection of one’s right to acquire an abortion and by
requiring funding for abortion.179 This funding will continue to implemented after Roe via state
mandated public funding programs and requirement of private insurers to cover abortions, as
well as the relevant aftercare should they cover childbirth.180 In the face of protestors outside of
abortion clinics, Maryland has signed into law protections for the safety of abortion clinics from
outside interference with special attention paid to the safety of the entrances of these
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clinics.181Delaware will continue to prohibit abortion at and after viability,182 restrict public
funding for abortion procedures and aftercare,183 and generally require parental notification of a
minor’s abortion.184 All abortions must be reported to the state by abortion providers within
Delaware as well.185 With those restrictions noted, Delaware has signed into law statutory
protection for one’s right to acquire an abortion within the state and, quite recently, repealed the
remainder of its pre-Roe bans on abortions.186
Massachusetts will continue to hold this same reporting requirement and prohibit
abortion at or past twenty-four weeks LMP, except where the health of the mother or fetus are at
risk in the case of pregnancy.187 In most cases, Massachusetts will continue to require that a
parental figure of some sort consenting to a minor’s abortion, if the minor is under the age of
sixteen.188 Conversely, Massachusetts protects one’s right to acquire an abortion both via state
law and constitutional interpretation of the state’s constitution. This constitutional protection was
based in due process protections within the state’s constitution in a Massachusetts case involving
a class action lawsuit launched in part by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in
1981.189 What is rather intriguing about this timeline is the fact that the state law and the state’s
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repeal to its pre-Roe ban on abortion occurred much later in 2017 and 2018 respectively.190
Recently, Massachusetts has passed further legislation protecting one’s right to acquire an
abortion within the state; the state has recently passed legislation to expressly loosen restrictions
on who may provide abortions and new benchmarks for public funding for abortion, as well as
the relevant aftercare.191 Similar to Maryland, Massachusetts has passed a law which protects
abortion clinics from criminal acts, as well as those who interact with these clinics.192 Rhode
Island holds a similar parental consent law to Massachusetts and prohibits abortion past
viability.193 TRAP laws involving reporting requirements are, also, present within this state.194
Prior to 2019, Rhode Island lacked legislation protecting one’s right to acquire an abortion. As
the state passed new statutory protections for legal and protected access to abortion in 2019,
Rhode Island repealed several of its unconstitutional bans on abortion and the procedures
involved.195 Prior limitations to private insurance coverage of care related to abortion were
repealed due to this new legislative agenda, as well.196
Furthermore, Maine will continue to prohibit abortion after viability and will generally
require parental consent for a minor’s abortion, though the minor’s physician may waive this
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aspect on an as needed basis.197 Providers must, however, report abortions to the state.198 While
these restrictions will remain in effect after Roe is overturned, the state has, via statutory law,
signed into law protections for abortion since 1993 with revisions to its revenue statutes on the
matter.199 Since 2019, access to abortion has been expanded within the state via new public
funding for abortion and requirements on private insurers to provide coverage for abortion, in
cases wherein the plan covers maternity care.200 As of 2022, though a similar was recently
before, the state passed a law which created medical safety zones around clinics, as to protect
persons acquiring and providing abortions from criminal acts meant to deter them from these
centers.201 The District of Columbia is worth noting here, though currently limits within D.C. are
pitted on public funding and who may provide surgical abortions, as it is subject to plenary
congressional power.202 Thus, if the U.S. Congress, though legislation to the opposite effect is far
more likely given the current political leanings of the Congress, decides to restrict abortion or
prohibit abortion with D.C., then its citizens will have little recourse. Even still, D.C. has passed
legislation, beginning in 2020, which expressly recognizes one’s right to acquire an abortion and
one’s right to self-manage abortions, amending the Human Rights Act of 1977 (which allowed
persecution of those who acquire abortion so long as it was in effect).203
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Last but not least are the states of the northeast which will act to expand access to
abortion after Roe is overturned: New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and Vermont. While two
abortion-restrictive laws remain present in New Jersey (a prohibition on D&X abortions and a
parental notification requirement), these two laws were deemed unconstitutional by the New
Jersey Supreme Court, under an equal protection clause present in the New Jersey
Constitution.204 Thus, these two laws are not in effect within New Jersey. While the highest court
of the state has contended that the right to privacy evident in the state’s constitution merits a
woman’s fundamental right to control her own body since 1982, New Jersey enacted a statutory
protection this same effect in 2022.205 Moreover, the state provides, as it will continue post Roe,
public funding for abortion care and for advance practice clinicians (APCs) to provide care
related to abortion up to fourteen-weeks LMP.206
Though New York and Vermont lack constitutional protections for abortion, both states
signed into effect statutory protections for a woman’s right to choose to obtain an abortion,
amongst other reproductive rights, in 2019.207 While New York prohibits abortion after twentyfour weeks post-fertilization (twenty-two weeks LMP) unless said pregnancy is not viable or
proves a health risk to the mother,208 Vermont requires abortion providers to report to the
state.209 New York, as the first state to have legalized abortion three years prior to Roe, provides
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public funding for abortion and requires that private insurers cover abortion care.210 Both
Vermont and Connecticut provide funding for medically necessary abortions,211 and do not
greatly restrict who may provide abortion care.212 While New York does restrict who may
provide abortion care to a lesser degree as even APCs are allowed to provide abortion care,213
New York and Connecticut act to protect abortion clinics from criminal acts.214 It is worth noting
that Connecticut prohibits abortion post-viability, as well as during the third trimester generally,
and retains few TRAP laws relating to reporting and the way in which abortion clinics operate.215
It does appear as though, given Connecticut’s recent trend in legislation supportive of greater
access to abortion, these laws represent how Connecticut will treat abortion in the near future. In
fact, all four of the presently described states will certainly act to bolster greater access to
abortion post Roe.

Section 3.7 – Access to Abortion in the Outliers
The outliers, from Alaska to Puerto Rico, have remained mixed in their decisions
regarding protection to one’s right to acquire an abortion, as they all respond to quite distinctive
geopolitical issues. Alaska, through interpretation of the highest Alaskan court via language
within the Alaskan constitution,216 and Hawaii, through state legislation dating back to 1970
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which has acted to bolster protection of access to abortion within the state, are likely to maintain
legal abortion with some restrictive law surrounding access to abortion.217 Governor Dunleavy
and the legislature of Alaska have attempted to restrict access to abortion in recent years, from
voting to prohibit D&E abortions (permanently enjoined) to an executive order aimed at banning
abortions, and relevant aftercare as “non-essential or elective” procedures unnecessary to be
provided during the COVID-19 pandemic.218 As with many states which have signed in statutory
protection or constitutionally interpreted protections for abortion, the Alaskan legislature, over
the last decade, has focused in expanding upon targeted restrictions on abortion providers (TRAP
laws).219 The Alaska Supreme Court, through striking down reporting requirements for minors
and a law which required parental involvement in the abortion process, may reasonably be
expected to continue to act in support of protection of access to abortion while new legislation is
proposed and enacted in Alaska which acts to restrict abortion.220 Naturally, Dunleavy met
plenty of scrutiny and rolled back this executive order only a week later. As the Alaskan
Supreme Court and greater Alaskan population are supportive of legal abortion, we may be
relatively certain that abortion will remain legal after Roe is overturned.
As previously mentioned, Hawaii legalized abortion prior to Roe and has since acted to
greater bolster access to abortion for women within the state. Though the state has placed into
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law the viability standard and limits those who may provide abortions to those medically
trained,221 Hawaii has statutory protection in place for one’s right to acquire an abortion and
provides public funding for abortion-related services.222 The state’s constitution, though it has
not been extended by judgments of the state’s Supreme Court, contains a right to privacy clause
which may be used to greater protect one’s fundamental right to acquire an abortion.223 Hawaii
will certainly continue to protect one’s access to abortion after Roe is overturned, and will likely
act to expand this access.
Past the outlier states, not of the American territories will act to legalize abortion nor
protect access to abortion for their local populations. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands,
however, currently hold no legislation which will outright ban abortion, though both heavily
restrict when a woman may procure an abortion. Puerto currently prohibits abortion unless the
procedure would prove positively “therapeutic” or protect the life of the pregnant person and
retains a law which requires abortion providers to report their services to the government.224
APCs, and other providers of abortion with less medical training, are not permitted to provide
abortions within the territory and the Puerto Rican governor recently signed into effect a civil
code which names fetuses as people, thereby requiring their treatment of fetuses to favorable to
the fetus at hand.225 Though this strange law remains in effect, the Puerto Rican Constitution
contains an explicit right to privacy clause which may come to protect access to abortion if the
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state’s Supreme Court provides a judgment to that effect.226 Thus, as no outright ban is in effect,
or set go into effect after Dobbs, and there is no protection present for one’s right to acquire an
abortion without Roe within the territory, it is rather unclear how the law will progress, though
the current trend of government within the territory is moving toward banning abortion. Notably,
this territory repealed its pre-Roe ban in 201, while the only protection that the territory has
signed into effect protects woman’s ability to acquire family leave after an abortion.227
Perhaps more confusing is the legal status of the United States Virgin Islands (USVI), as
this territory does not have a constitution despite several constitutional conventions having
occurred within the territory.228 Thus, this territory is largely governed by the Organic Act of
1964,229 as expanded upon by the Mink Amendment of 1968,230 which provides the Congress
plenary power over governing the territory. The Virgin Islands have come to, many of the
restrictive legislation enacted within the territory has been placed into effect in the past few
years, generally prohibit abortion at twenty-four weeks “post-commencement” and only allow
abortions to be performed within hospitals from weeks twelve through to twenty-four in this
framework.231 Furthermore, the territory holds restrictions on who may provide abortions and
maintains a parental notification law, which does not hold similar exceptions to parental
notification laws in several states which I have described previously.232 As with Puerto Rico, it is
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already quite difficult for women within the territory to acquire abortions and this difficulty will
likely increase after Roe is overturned.
Past these two territories, the remaining American territories will likely outright ban
abortion in most cases. Guam, which is governed similarly to the USVI by the U.S. Congress via
the Organic Act, currently generally prohibits abortion at thirteen-weeks LMP and prohibits
D&X procedures.233 Similar to many states of the south and Midwest regions of the United
States, Guam has many TRAP restrictions in effect and restrictions as to public funding.234
Women seeking abortion must go through a twenty-four-hour waiting period,235 biased
counseling,236 and must acquire either parental or judicial consent to acquire an abortion, if the
woman at hand is a minor.237 The woman at hand must, often, spend hours waiting to acquire an
abortion, after all other restrictions have been traversed, at the singular abortion clinic on the
island which is allowed to operate within the scope of the TRAP laws within the territory.238
Though the Congress established for Guam a personalized Bill of Rights, modeled on the Bill of
Rights, Guam will certainly not retain language protecting one’s fundamental right to acquire an
abortion via constitutional interpretation, or otherwise, after Roe is overturned.239 Rather, a
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majority of the restrictive laws aforementioned were placed into effect in the last five years,
meaning the trend is not towards legal abortion.
Further on this trend, it appears to be present in the following two territories as well.
American Samoa, though it is generally governed by the Secretary of the Interior and its citizens
are U.S. nationals, has already generally banned abortion pre-Dobbs.240 Prior to American
Samoa’s use of the COVID-19 pandemic to effectively ban abortion, the territory had generally
banned abortion, with only few exceptions generally related to the health of the mother.241
Notably, American Samoa, along with the Northern Mariana Islands, does not have an abortion
clinic present in its territory.242 In the case of the Northern Mariana Islands, the territory’s
constitution specifically names abortion as illegal unless provided by law and the territory only
holds relationship to the United States via the 1976 Covenant between the two.243 Though, in
1995, the Attorney General of the CNMI stated that the territory would provide legal access to
abortion just as fifty states had done, the CNMI certainly does not protect this access today.244
Thus, it is not far-fetched to say that American Samoa, as previously described, and the Northern
Mariana Islands will act to ban abortion after Roe, just as they had prior.

Conclusion:
Through the course of thesis, I have established a timeline of how the laws and
sentiments surrounding one’s right to acquire an abortion from the mid-late 19th century to now.
In Chapter One, I focused on how abortion became illegal throughout each state of the United
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States as well as how illegal abortions became commonplace nationally, as well as the clear
issues this legislative agenda brought to the women of the United States. In this section, through
analysis of the formation of coalitions for legal abortion and legislative action intended to roll
back laws against abortion, I highlighted the fundamentals of the Pro-Choice movement, and the
reason Roe v. Wade came when it did. In the following chapter, I explored precisely how, and to
what extent, Roe v. Wade, and following Supreme Court judgments like Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, protected one’s constitutional right to acquire an abortion
within the United States, as well as how the vague language of these decisions allowed for everdeveloping legislation intended to restrict access to abortion at the state level. It was in this
period that the Pro-Life movement sought to undermine the protections provided in Roe v. Wade.
Though these attempts appeared limited at first, in the last two decades, as outlined in Chapter
Three, there have been monumental changes in the legislative direction of many states within the
Union, namely in the Midwestern and Southern regions, and significant changes to membership
of the Supreme Court, which have given substantial ground to states in their ability to apply
restrictions well outside of “excessive governmental restriction.”
With this background established and detailed, I then focused on precisely how access to
abortion will shift in the following months given state legislation set to take effect sans federal
protection of one’s right to acquire an abortion. It through the analysis of Chapters 3 and 4 that
we may reach certain conclusions as to access to abortion within the United States after the
Mississippi decision is reached.
Midwestern, Southern, and Southwestern states, as well as all territories of the United
States will experience the most substantial shifts to access to abortion after this judgment is
reached lifting the protections of Roe. Most states in these regions will, in the short term (as we

Foster, Mitchell 67
may only confidently describe the political climate for a limited period of time), act to greatly
restrict access to abortion, past what is currently normal in these regions, or ban abortion
outright, thereby forcing female residents to either carry their unwanted, or unsafe, pregnancies
to term or migrate to states which allow for legal abortions.
The current political climate, though this is certainly subject to change prior to and
directly after the Dobbs judgment is released and in effect, is such that twenty-five states will
almost certainly ban abortion is nearly all cases; each one of our five regions will ban or heavily
restrict abortion in nearly all cases as well. Beyond total bans, eighteen states will likely act to
restrict access to abortion, or potentially come to ban (in cases wherein the state’s highest court
has not yet ruled on the matter or where political support against abortion is great enough), via
LMP bans and TRAP restrictive statutes. Of these eighteen states, three currently have no
statutes or constitutional interpretations which directly name abortion as legal; fifteen of these
states do, in fact, enjoy either constitutional or statutory protection for abortion, though each one
of these states have, while most state legislatures have done so quite recently, restrictive laws in
effect. Only eight states will act to protect greater access to abortion, via assuring abortion clinics

Figure 1 -- Blue is expanded access, yellow is abortion-protected, light red is not-protected, and red are states which will likely ban
abortion after Dobbs.
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are plentiful, assuring that abortion is covered by insurance, et cetera. Perhaps a beneficial tool in
portraying this access is by a map (directly above); the Center for Reproductive Rights, as I have
mentioned them prior, has a superb map of the United States, as well as its territories, which
depicts how states will act to either protect or restrict abortion.
How many will it impact? Millions of women, which under current restrictions likely
need to travel a significantly shorter distance, will have to travel to acquire abortions and
abortion aftercare. The most impoverished women will suffer the most, as they will be unable to
take off work or pay for travel to abortion-protected states. Even if Roe is not overturned,
considering the precedents set in judgment like Casey and Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson,
we will see access to abortion disintegrate in several regions generating essentially abortion
deserts. There will, as we saw in the period in which abortion was illegal in the United States, be
higher incidents of illegal abortions in cases wherein young women cannot travel from states
which ban or heavily restrict abortion and, thus, death due to the challenges related to illegal
abortions, and poor aftercare. We will likely see higher incidents of injury or death related to
miscarriages, or otherwise non-viable pregnancies, within states which act to greatly restrict or
ban abortion. There will also, consistent with the goals of the pro-life movement, be fewer
abortions performed in the United States.
Even if the judgment reached by the Supreme Court in dealing with the Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Organization miraculously ends with Roe v. Wade intact, this shift is likely
inevitable, as decisions like Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson proved to undermine the fundamental holdings of Roe, in
states which name it their mission to restrict or ban abortion. While this reality may seem bleak
for those who describe themselves as pro-choice, there are certain methods by which pro-choice
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advocates may combat. As I have discussed, a revival to the Women’s Health Protection Act and
the EACH Woman Act, or like legislation at the federal level, would be a viable for pro-choice
legislators moving forward. Where this movement has reigned victorious in the past, namely just
prior to Roe v. Wade, was, and is, at the state level in legal advocacy. As the Supreme Court
population shifts, we may very well see a return to protection to abortion federally, though
focusing on this possibility is illogical currently. Rather, the efforts of the ALI and Planned
Parenthood in the past have been the most clearly successful attempts of the pro-choice
movement in acquiring legal abortion. Most pressing in the success of the actions of these two
organizations is civic engagement, which has been extraordinary in the issue of abortion as
compared to other issues less important to voters. So, these efforts may be revitalized. In order to
achieve these goals, further abortion restrictive legislation would need to be blocked at the state
and federal levels, funding acquired for coverage campaigns, state legislators acting to repeal
bans on abortion as well as abortion restrictive, and a repeal to the Hyde Amendment, as well as
other federal legislation which acts to restrict abortion (Partial-Abortion Birth Act), by legislators
representing states at the federal level. These aspects would all have to be sought to the fullest
extent possible if women within these abortion deserts are to have any chance at acquiring a legal
and safe abortion without great strain or at all.

Areas for Further Research:
Though I feel as though my research aids in gaining a more complete sense of how access
to legal and safe abortion will shift after Roe v. Wade is overturned, this topic could always be
better understood by more holistic research and analysis. If I had more time to continue this
work, I would have spent far more time researching into each and every state within the United
States, as well as its territories, as to understand precisely how their legislation has evolved over
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the last hundred years. Looking to why certain states have had far more civic participation in
amending state constitutions or in proposing new statutes to their state governments would prove
helpful in understanding subtle differences in state laws.
Further research into how access to safe abortions and how prevalent abortions remain in
countries which currently ban abortion would aid us in understanding precisely how dangerous it
might, or might not, be for women within abortion deserts today, rather than in the early
twentieth century United States. One international aspect worth further consideration is how
other nations may interact with the United States after Roe is pulled; International human rights,
as described by the United Nations in various articles of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, hold abortion to be a fundamental human right, so a
significant portion of the United States banning abortion may come to the attention of the U.N.
and cause issues in foreign policy. This aspect alone would merit research and, if the backlash
were to be great enough, may yield the sort of conclusion which pressures some bipartisan
agreement in the federal government.
Another significant aspect of the Dobbs decision is the precedent which it sets for this
Court moving forward. Though it was not sensible to delve into this aspect during this thesis, this
aspect is perhaps the most significant of the judgment entirely. While the Supreme Court does
occasionally roll-back its judgments, its likely decision to roll back one of its most significant
and controversial judgments in the last century is not typical of a court which operates at that
magnitude. This would be a superb area to pit further research upon in the course of another
project.
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